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ABSTRACT
Recently the influence maximization problem has received
much attention for its applications on viral marketing and
product promotions. However, such influence maximization
problems have not taken into account the monetary effect
on the purchasing decision of individuals. To fulfill this
gap, in this paper, we aim for maximizing the revenue by
considering the quantity constraint on the promoted com-
modity. For this problem, we not only identify a proper
small group of individuals as seeds for promotion but also
determine the pricing of the commodity. To tackle the rev-
enue maximization problem, we first introduce a strategic
searching algorithm, referred to as Algorithm PRUB, which
is able to derive the optimal solutions. After that, we further
modify PRUB to propose a heuristic, Algorithm PRUB+IF,
for obtaining feasible solutions more efficiently on larger in-
stances. Experiments on real social networks with differ-
ent valuation distributions demonstrate the effectiveness of
PRUB and PRUB+IF.
1. INTRODUCTION
Due to the advance of the Web 2.0 techniques, various
kinds of websites have become parts of our life. Most peo-
ple nowadays are used to sharing, seeking and obtaining
information, and interacting with others through various
social networking websites such as Digg, Slashdot, Face-
book, and Twitter, to name a few. As more and more peo-
ple join these social websites, the phenomenon of immense
quantity of information flow and influence spread becomes
prominent. This then motivates the utilization of this phe-
nomenon, known as the“word-of-mouth”effect, to bring sig-
nificant potential benefits in many types of business such as
viral marketing and innovation promotion. For example, a
company can effectively promote its brand and new prod-
ucts by involving a group of influential people spreading the
good words over social websites. Hence, in very recent years,
there is active research [3, 7, 15, 19] exploring the problem
of influence maximization.
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Existing works studied the influence maximization prob-
lem generally based on two kinds of diffusion models, the
Linear Threshold (LT) and the Independent Cascade (IC)
models. In the LT model, the influence strength between
a pair of individuals is modeled as a fixed weight, and the
influence on an individual is described as cumulative. An
individual is activated when the sum of the weights propa-
gated from his/her activated neighbors exceeds his/her own
threshold. The IC model assumes that each influence of one
to another is an independent chance to activate the latter
with a probability. On both models, the problem of influ-
ence maximization aims at identifying a proper group (of a
specified size) of individuals as seeds to have the number of
activated people maximized. However, note that such in-
fluence maximization problems have not taken into account
the monetary aspect, which usually plays a crucial factor in
people’s purchase decisions. That is, maximizing the influ-
ence spread does not necessarily bring maximum revenue, as
an individual may be very interested in a new smartphone,
but does not purchase the smartphone due to its high price.
According to the studies in the fields of social psychology
[2, 8] and economics [10, 14, 20], one’s valuation towards a
commodity will be positively influenced by those that have
purchased the commodity, which is known as the herd men-
tality or positive network externalities. In other words, peo-
ple tend to imitate others in their consumer behaviors, which
will result in irrational valuations of the commodity, i.e.,
higher valuations beyond their inherent valuations. Based
on these phenomena, Mirrokni et al. [17] addressed theRev-
enue Maximization problem by incorporating the mon-
etary concept into the maximization problem of influence
spread based on the LT model. In the monetary LT model,
the influence strength (or said weight) is transformed into
the valuation concept, and the individual threshold is re-
garded as the inherent valuation. One’s valuation of a com-
modity is thus the sum of his/her inherent valuation and
the valuation increment from social influences. An individ-
ual then pays for a commodity and propagates his/her in-
fluence whenever her/his valuation is larger than or equal to
the pricing of the commodity. Consider the network shown
in Figure 1 as an example, where the number contained in
each node is the inherent valuation and the number on an
edge from one node to another is the weight, i.e., the influ-
ence strength. For the ease of illustration, without loss of
generality, the function F (x) = x is used to transform the
effects of the social influences cumulated on an individual
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Figure 1: A network with the monetary concept.
into the valuation concept in this example. If f purchases
the commodity, c’s valuation is increased to $3+F (1) = $4.
If a, e, and f all purchase the commodity, the valuation in-
crement for c is F (3 + 2 + 1) = $6 and c’s valuation thus
becomes $3 + $6 = $9. The objective of the revenue max-
imization problem thus aims at determining the pricing of
the commodity and identifying a seed group of individuals
for promotion so that the total revenue is maximized.
However, to the best of our knowledge, none of the existing
works has taken a quantity constraint on commodities into
account. Note that due to the consideration of marketing
strategies or practical conditions, quantities of commodities
are often constrained in the real world. For example, the
scarcity fallacy usually makes commodities more desirable
[21], as a company may want to release limited edition com-
modities to boost customer desire. Another example is the
case of promoting a concert, where the quantity of the con-
cert tickets is constrained by the number of available seats.
In this case, due to the schedules of the musicians or singers,
it is hard to add more shows and the total number of concert
tickets. Hence, selecting seeds to receive free commodities
will reduce the quantities of commodities that can be sold.
This makes the prior works unapplicable to determine the
proper pricing and obtain maximum revenue. For example,
suppose that the network shown in Figure 1 is considered,
where the diffusion model with the monetary concept in the
work [17] is adopted and the function F (x) = x is used to
transform the effects of the social influence into the valuation
concept. Without consideration of the commodity quantity,
the maximum revenue is $28 obtained at the pricing of $7
with the seed group {d, f}. With the influence from {d, f},
a and e are the first to purchase the commodity, since both
their valuations $2 + F (5) = $7 are equal to the pricing
of $7. Then, b and c will subsequently purchase the com-
modity due to their valuations $0 + F (2 + 4 + 4) = $10
and $3 + F (3 + 2 + 1) = $9, respectively. However, if the
quantity of commodities is limited to 4, the revenue will de-
crease to $14 since two free commodities given to the seeds
d and f should be taken off first. In this case, letting the
commodity be priced at $6 and choosing only d as the seed
will be the best. Under the influence of d, a first purchases
the commodity since its valuation $2 + F (5) = $7 is larger
than the pricing of $6. Then, both b and c purchase the
commodities due to their valuations $0+F (2+4) = $6 and
$3 + F (3) = $6, respectively. Finally, since a, b, and c all
pay for the commodity sold at the price of $6, the maximum
revenue is $18. Therefore, when the quantity of commodi-
ties is limited, we argue the need of new approaches for the
revenue maximization problem.
Specifically, we address the revenue maximization problem
with a quantity constraint on commodities. Given a limited
quantity of commodities and a social network with mone-
tary concept regarding to the commodity, the problem is to
determine the pricing of the commodity and identify a small
group of people, i.e., a seed group, to be the initial customers
receiving freebies to help promote the commodity at the be-
ginning, so that the total revenue is maximized. In this
paper, we investigate this problem on the monetary-concept
incorporated LT-model [17], and propose Algorithm PRUB
(Pricing searching strategy using Revenue Upper Bound)
to derive the optimal solutions. Then, we further revise
PRUB to propose a heuristic Algorithm PRUB+IF (Pricing
searching strategy using Revenue Upper Bound with Impor-
tance Feedback) for better efficiency. Experiments on real
social networks show the good effectiveness of PRUB and
PRUB+IF, demonstrating the revenue maximization with
and without a quantity constraint differs from each other.
In summary, the contributions of this paper are:
1. We are the first to address the general case of the rev-
enue maximization problem. Note that the previous
work of the revenue maximization without a quantity
constraint is a special case of our problem with the
quantity set as the total number of individuals on the
social network.
2. For the addressed problem, we proposed the optimal
PRUB as well as a heuristic PRUB+IF.
3. Experiments on real social networks demonstrate the
effectiveness of the proposed approaches for both gen-
eral and special cases of the revenue maximization
problem. Note even in the case without a commod-
ity constraint, the proposed approach outperforms the
state of the art approach that incorporates the mone-
tary concept [17].
2. PROBLEM FORMULATION
To formulate the revenue maximization problem, in this
section, we first describe the social network with the mone-
tary concept, then explain how the social influences propa-
gate over the network using the monetary-concept incorpo-
rated LT-model [17], and finally define the revenue and the
revenue maximization problem formally.
Given a commodity, a social network with the monetary
concept, referred to as a monetizing social network, is
a weighted digraph G = (V,X,E,W,F ), where V is the set
of individuals and for each individual v ∈ V , his/her in-
herent valuation χv is carried in X. Usually, the valuation
information X can be estimated and learned from question-
naires or historical sales data, with regard to the commodity
[13]. For any individuals u, v ∈ V , if u’s purchase will di-
rectly encourage v’s desire for the commodity, an edge from
u to v, denoted as euv ∈ E (E standing for the edge set),
represents the existance of the influence, and wuv ∈W rep-
resents the influence strength as the weight on euv. Adopt-
ing the Concave Graph Model in the work [17], we con-
sider a non-negative, non-decreasing, and concave function
F : R+ → R+ with F (0) = 0 to transform the weights into
the valuation concept. That is, given a set of individuals S
directly exerting influences on an individual v, v’s valuation
towards a commodity will become χv + F (
∑
i∈S wiv).
Based on the monetary-concept incorporated LT-model
[17], the propagation of social influences over the monetiz-
ing social network happens whenever individuals adopt the
commodity. An individual adopts the commodity if and only
if 1) the pricing of the commodity is less than or equal to
his/her valuation, or 2) this individual is an initial customer
receiving a freebie. After an individual adopts the com-
modity, he/she will then exert influences on his/her out-
neighbors to encourage them and raise their valuations for
adoption. The following shows an example of social influ-
ences propagating over the monetizing social network.
Example 1. Given the monetizing social network in Fig-
ure 1 and the concave influence function F (x) = x, consider
the promotion of a concert. Suppose that the pricing of the
concert tickets is $7 and the seed group is A = {d}. Influ-
enced by d, the valuations of a, b, and f are increased by
F (5) = $5, F (4) = $4, and F (2) = $2, respectively. The val-
uations of a, b and f thus become $2+$5 = $7, $0+$4 = $4,
and $0 + $2 = $2, respectively. Then, note that as the val-
uation of a is equal to the pricing of the concert tickets $7,
a also adopts the concert ticket and exerts influences on
its out-neighbors b and c. The valuations of b and c thus
increase to $0 + F (4 + 2) = $6 and $3 + F (3) = $6, respec-
tively. After that, as no other individuals adopt the concert
ticket, the influence propagation stops. Consequently, under
d’s influence, a will also adopt the concert ticket, and the
valuations of b, c and f become $6, $6, and $2, respectively.
Consider another example of the seed group A = {d, f}.
Under the influence of d and f , the valuations of a, b, c and
e are raised to $7, $4, $4, and $7, respectively. (Here d’s
influence on f is neglected since f as an initial customer has
already adopted the concert ticket.) Hence, a and e adopt
the concert tickets and exert influences. Consequently, the
valuations of b and c become:
b : $0 + F (4(from d) + 2(from a) + 4(from e)) = $10
c : $3 + F (1(from f) + 3(from a) + 2(from e)) = $9
In the end, a, b, c, and e all adopt the concert tickets since
their final valuations are larger than or equal to the pricing
of the concert tickets $7. 
Here we define that the revenue comes from the number
of people paying for the commodity and the pricing of the
commodity. Recall Example 1 where the pricing is $7 and
the seed group is {d, f}, and suppose that the quantity of
the concert tickets is 4. The revenue is $7 × 2 = $14, since
two concert tickets are used as free tickets given to d and f ,
and only two concert tickets are left for sale (even though a,
b, c, and e all want to purchase these concert tickets).
Formally, given the quantity of commodities n, the pricing
p of the commodity, and the seed group A, the revenue is
defined as follows.
Definition 1. Revenue function. Given the quantity n,
the revenue at the pricing of p with the seed group A is
R(n, p,A) = p×min{|σ(A) \A|, n− |A|},
where σ(A) ⊇ A is the set of individuals adopting the com-
modity under the influences of A.
To increase the revenue, finding the proper pricing p and
identifying a proper seed group A is important. Consider
the same setting mentioned above, but with an empty seed
group and the pricing set as $1. The revenue is R(4, $1, ∅) =
$1× 4 = $4, which is less than R(4, $7, {d, f}) = $14. Since
any company will expect to earn as higher revenue as possi-
ble given a fixed amount of commodities, in this paper, we
are interested in looking for such pricing and a seed group
as initial customers that can bring maximum revenue. The
proposed problem is formally defined as follows.
Definition 2. The RMw/QC Problem: RevenueMax-
imization with a Quantity Constraint. Given a mon-
etizing social network G = (V,X,E,W,F ), a set of input
prices P ⊆ R+, and a quantity of commodities n, the prob-
lem is to determine the pricing pmax ∈ P of the commodity
and find a seed group Amax ⊆ V as initial customers, where
|Amax| ≤ n, such that the revenue R(n, p,A) is maximized,
i.e., (pmax, Amax) = argmax
p,A
R(n, p,A).
Note that the revenue function R(n, p,A) is not single-
peaked with respect to the pricing, which means the ap-
proaches such as the binary search and the gradient decent
search are not applicable to finding out the optimal pric-
ing. For example, following the setting of Example 1 and
letting the quantity of the concert tickets be 4, we obtain
the highest revenue at pricing of $6, $7, and $8 as $18, $14,
and $16, respectively (with the seed groups {d}, {d, f}, and
{d, e}, accordingly). Obviously, with respect to the pricing,
R(n, p,A) is not single-peaked.
Furthermore, the RMw/QC problem can be proved to be
NP-hard. To show this, we first introduce a special case of
RMw/QC, and then prove that this special case is NP-hard.
As the special case is NP-hard, RMw/QC is thus NP-hard.
Definition 3. SpecialRM. This problem is a special case
of RMw/QC, and asks for only one input price and a sufficient
quantity of commodities for the population. That is, given
G, P = {p}, and n = |V |, SpecialRM is to determine a seed
group A such that R(|V |, p, A) is maximized.
Theorem 1. The problem of SpecialRM is NP-hard.
Proof. We reduce the Minimum Vertex Cover (MVC)
problem to the SpecialRM problem. Given every instance
of MVC involving an undirected graph G′ = (V ′, E′), we can
construct a corresponding instance G = (V,X,E,W,F ) of
SpecialRM as follows. (1) Set V = V ′; (2) set X = {χv|∀v ∈
V, χv = 0}; (3) direct all edges in both directions, i.e., for
each euv ∈ E
′, euv ∈ E and evu ∈ E; (4) for each euv ∈ E,
define wuv =
p
din(v)
, where din(v) is the in-degree of v in G;
and (5) set F (x) = x. For the instance of SpecialRM, if
there exists a minimum set A that maximizes the revenue,
we can obtain another set A′ = A∪ (V \σ(A)). Then, it can
be shown that A′ is the minimum vertex cover of G′ since
σ(A′) ⊇ σ(A) ∪ σ(V \ σ(A)) ⊇ σ(A) ∪ (V \ σ(A)) = V.
Theorem 1 is thus proved.
3. ALGORITHM
In this section, for the revenue maximization problem, we
first propose Algorithm PRUB (Pricing searching strategy
using Revenue Upper Bound) that is able to derive the opti-
mal solutions. Note that finding the optimal pair of pmax and
Amax in the revenue maximization problem is exhausted.
Then, for better efficiency, a heuristic Algorithm PRUB+IF
(PRUB with Importance Feedback) is introduced following
the framework of PRUB.
Table 1: (a) The maximum valuations; (b) the upper
bounds of maximum revenue.
(a)
v Xmax(v)
a $8
b $10
c $9
d $4
e $7
f $4
(b)
p Rbound(4, p)
$1 $4
$2 $8
$3 $12
$4 $16
$5 $20
$6 $24
$7 $28
$8 $24
$9 $18
$10 $10
3.1 Algorithm PRUB
To tackle the RMw/QC problem, Algorithm PRUB is de-
signed to obtain the optimal solutions. As mentioned pre-
viously, finding a proper pair of pricing and seed group is
critical in this problem, since the revenue comes from the
pricing of the commodity and the number of people paying
for the commodity. A na¨ıve approach for finding the optimal
pair of pricing pmax and seed group Amax is to search at all
p ∈ P , enumerate all seed groups A, and calculate the cor-
responding revenue R(n, p,A). The rationale of Algorithm
PRUB is based on this na¨ıve approach and prunes the search
space by 1) progressively filtering out non-candidate pricing
and 2) deriving an upper bound of the size of seed groups
for each price. We illustrate the two ideas of pruning in the
following.
Non-candidate Pricing Filtering. The first idea is to
prune the searching on non-candidate pricing. Motivated by
the concern of only maximum revenue, this pruning derives
an upper bound of maximum revenue at each price, and
utilizes an achievable global revenue rglobal that records the
maximum revenue discovered so far to progressively filter
out the pricing that will not result in higher revenue. That
is, if an upper bound of maximum revenue at each price
can be derived, PRUB then does not need to seek the seed
group for maximum revenue at a specific price when the
upper bound at this price is less than or equal to rglobal.
When rglobal is updated and increased progressively after the
successful searching of the seed group at each price, the non-
candidate pricing is also progressively detected and filtered
out.
In order to infer the upper bound of maximum revenue
at a specific price, the maximum number of individuals who
have potential for adopting the commodity at this price is
needed. To find out whether or not an individual has this po-
tential, it needs to estimate the valuation of the individual.
Therefore, in the following, we first introduce the definitions
of maximum valuations and potential buyers for defining the
upper bound of maximum revenue.
Definition 4. Maximum valuation. The maximum val-
uation of an individual v is the valuation under the influences
from all v’s in-neighbors, which is denoted as
Xmax(v) = χv + F (
∑
u∈v’s in-neighbors
wuv).
Definition 5. Potential buyer. An individual v is re-
garded as a potential buyer at a specific price p if v has po-
tential for adopting the commodity at p, i.e., Xmax(v) ≥ p.
Definition 6. Upper bound of maximum revenue.
Given a quantity constraint n, the upper bound of maxi-
mum revenue at a price p is
Rbound(n, p) = p×min{n,mp}, (1)
where mp is the number of potential buyers at p, i.e., mp =
|{v|v ∈ V,Xmax(v) ≥ p}|.
Example 2. Given the monetizing social network in Fig-
ure 1, the concave influence function F (x) = x, and a set
of input prices P = {p|p ∈ I+, 1 ≤ p ≤ 10}, consider the
promotion of a concert. Table 1(a) shows the maximum val-
uation of each individual. Suppose the quantity of the con-
cert tickets is set as 4. The corresponding upper bounds of
maximum revenue for all prices are listed in Table 1(b). 
In addition, to have better effectiveness of pruning by uti-
lizing the upper bound of maximum revenue, PRUB searches
the prices in a descending order of the upper bounds. Then,
once PRUB discovers a price, at which the upper bound is
less than or equal to the achievable global revenue rglobal,
the searching for the following prices (including the current
price) can be ignored. Therefore, in the above example,
PRUB will start the examination of the prices from p = $7,
p = $6, p = $8, · · · , and so on.
Bound of Seed Group’s Size. The second idea for
pruning search space is to avoid enumerating useless seed
groups under a specific price. The inspiration is, under
the consideration of a specific price p, it involves more than
rglobal
p
quantities of commodities to be sold for finding the
revenue higher than the achievable global revenue rglobal
obtained so far. When considering the price p, Algorithm
PRUB then bounds the size of the seed groups as
|A| < n−
rglobal
p
, (2)
since the quantity of commodities is limited. Follow Exam-
ple 2, and suppose the achievable global revenue rglobal =
$10. In order to find the revenue higher than $10, when
searching at the price p = $7, PRUB expects more than 10
7
concert tickets left for sale and enumerates only the seed
groups of sizes less than or equal to 2 (since the quantity of
the concert tickets is set as 4). The searching on the seed
groups of sizes 3 and 4 is thus pruned.
Note that incorporating the two pruning methods is sat-
isfactory to the accuracy. Therefore, Algorithm PRUB is
still able to derive the optimal solutions, even though the
search space is reduced. The details of PRUB are presented
in Algorithm 1. In the following, we show an example to
illustrate how PRUB figures out the optimal pair of pmax
and Amax.
Example 3. Follow Example 2, and initialize pmax, Amax,
and rglobal as $0, an empty set, and $0, respectively. Accord-
ing to the upper bounds of maximum revenue in Table 1(b),
PRUB will consider the prices in the following order: p = $7,
p = $6, p = $8, · · · , and so on.
Beginning from the price $7, PRUB checks whether or not
Rbound(4, $7) > rglobal. Since $28 > $0, PRUB looks for the
maximum revenue at the price $7 by enumerating all the
seed groups whose size is bounded by Equation (2) (includ-
ing the size 0). First, for the empty seed group, no individ-
ual adopts the concert ticket at $7. So PRUB goes to the
size 1. Then, PRUB lists all the seed groups of size 1 since
Algorithm 1: PRUB
Input: A monetizing social network G = (V,X,E,W,F ); a
set of input prices P ; a quantity of commodities n.
Output: The pricing pmax; the seed group Amax.
1 pmax ← 0, Amax ← ∅, rglobal ← 0
2 Derive Rbound(n, p) for all p ∈ P
3 Sort all p ∈ P descendingly by Rbound(n, p)
4 for p ∈ P do
5 if p is non-candidate pricing then
6 return pmax, Amax
7 Enumerate all the seed groups whose size is bounded by
Equation (2) (including the size 0)
8 Compute R(n, p,A) for those enumerated seed groups
9 if any R(n, p,A) > rglobal then
10 pmax = p, Amax = A, rglobal = R(n, p,A)
11 return pmax, Amax
1 < 4− 0
7
= 4. Among all the seed groups of size 1, PRUB
finds the highest revenue R(4, $7, {d}) = $7 (referred to Ex-
ample 1). As $7 is higher than rglobal = $0, PRUB updates
pmax = $7, Amax = {d}, and rglobal = $7. Before seeking the
seed groups of size 2 for maximum revenue, PRUB ensures
2 < 4 − 7
7
= 3. After all seed groups of size 2 are enu-
merated, the highest revenue R(4, $7, {d, f}) = $14 is found
(referred to Example 1). Because $14 > rglobal = $7, PRUB
updates pmax = $7, Amax = {d, f}, and rglobal = $14. Later,
note that 3 > 4 − 14
7
= 2. The searching for the maximum
revenue at the price $7 stops. The next price considered is
$6. A similar process is performed until PRUB finds such a
price p that rglobal ≥ Rbound(4, p). In the end, the maximum
revenue is R(4, $6, {d}) = $18, where the pair of pmax = $6
and Amax = {d} is the optimal solution. 
Theorem 2. The time complexity of PRUB is O(2|V ||V |2|P |).
Proof. We first show that PRUB costs O(2|V ||V |2) time
at a specific price for searching the maximum revenue. Given
the quantity of commodities n, the largest size of the seed
group is n. In total, there are thus
n∑
i=0
(
|V |
i
)
seed groups. For
a seed group of size i, there are i seeds exerting influences on
the other O(|V | − i) individuals that are not seeds. Due to
the influence cascade, it costs O((|V |−i)2) time to figure out
the influence spread of a seed group of size i. Therefore, the
total time complexity for searching the maximum revenue
by enumerating seed groups is
O(
n∑
i=0
(
|V |
i
)
(|V | − i)2)
= O(
n∑
i=0
|V |!
(|V |−i)!i!
(|V | − i)2)
= O(
n∑
i=0
|V |2(|V |−1)!
(|V |−i−1)!i!
− |V |(|V |−1)(|V |−2)!
(|V |−i−1)!(i−1)!
)
= O(|V |2
n∑
i=0
(
|V |−1
i
)
− |V |2
n∑
i=0
(
|V |−2
i−1
)
+ |V |
n∑
i=0
(
|V |−2
i−1
)
)
= O(2|V |−1|V |2 − 2|V |−2|V |2 + 2|V |−2|V |)
= O(2|V ||V |2).
As searching at a price costs O(2|V ||V |2), the total time
complexity of PRUB is thus O(2|V ||V |2|P |). Theorem 2 is
proved.
Note that the high complexity of Algorithm PRUB indi-
cates the poor scalability of the optimal algorithm for real
social networks which are usually large. Therefore, in the
following subsection, we propose a heuristic based on the
framework of PRUB to obtain the feasible solutions on larger
instances.
3.2 Algorithm PRUB+IF
In this section, the heuristic algorithm PRUB+IF (PRUB
with Importance Feedback) is proposed as a feasible solu-
tion. The heuristic PRUB+IF differs from PRUB at the
way of finding the most proper seed group at each price. Fol-
lowing the framework of PRUB, PRUB+IF introduces the
concept of pricing-sensitive importance, accompanying the
contribution feedback from the out-neighbors, for selecting
seeds in a heuristic manner, instead of listing all seed groups.
The main idea of PRUB+IF is that, an individual with
greater potential for making others adopt the commodity
should be regarded as more important. Selecting the most
important individuals as seeds greedily is able to lead to a
feasible solution. Then, the question is how to evaluate one’s
potential for making others adopt the commodity. The intu-
ition is about how many others will be encouraged and how
much their valuations can be increased for approaching the
pricing, under one’s influence. We then accumulate these
effects to calculate one’s importance. Here only the effects
on potential buyers should be included in the accumulation
since only the potential buyers have possibilities of paying
for the commodity. In addition, note that the individuals
who newly adopt the commodity under one’s (direct and
indirect) influence will further spread their influences to en-
courage more others in adoption. In order to estimate one’s
importance more carefully, the effects through influence cas-
cades should also be included in the accumulation. There-
fore, PRUB+IF introduces the pricing-sensitive importance
that sums up the consideration of the normalized weights,
the influence propagation, and the potential buyers in the
measurement of one’s advantage in the commodity promo-
tion at the given pricing. Then, the strategy is to select
seeds in accordance with the pricing-sensitive importance.
In the following, we introduce the three key points, Nor-
malized Weight, Feedback of Influence Propagation, and
Potential-Buyer Filtering, in measuring the pricing-sensitive
importance. Briefly, for each individual u, 1) the Normalized
Weight is used to evaluate u’s importance according to u’s
direct effect on another individual v’s adoption; 2) the Feed-
back of Influence Propagation is incorporated to evaluate u’s
importance towards v by considering also the indirect effects
through influence cascades; 3) the Potential-Buyer Filtering
is considered to derive u’s pricing-sensitive importance from
accumulating all u’s direct and indirect effects on all the
other potential buyers.
1. Normalized Weight.
By intuition, for commodity promotion, an individ-
ual u’s importance towards another individual v can
be evaluated from how much v’s valuation approaches
the pricing due to u’s effect. Inspired by this intuition,
PRUB+IF calculates the normalized weight wˆuv, indi-
cating u’s importance towards v’s adoption, as follows.
wˆuv =


0, if p ≤ XA(v)
min{1,
F (wuv+
∑
i∈σ(A)
wiv)−F (
∑
i∈σ(A)
wiv)
p−XA(v)
}, otherwise
,
(3)
where XA(v) = χv + F (
∑
i∈σ(A)
wiv) is v’s valuation of
the commodity under the current seed group A’s ef-
fects. In the case of p ≤ XA(v), it means v has adopted
the commodity. So the normalized weight wˆuv = 0, in-
dicating that u’s importance towards v is none due to
no impact from u on v’s adoption of the commodity.
For the other case, the normalized weight from u to v
is bounded by 1, and is the portion of u’s impact on
v’s adoption of the commodity.
Example 4. Given the monetizing social network in
Figure 1 and the concave influence function F (x) = x,
consider the promotion of a concert. Given p = $7
and A = {}, no one has adopted the concert tickets.
Under this condition, X{}(a) = $2 is less than the
pricing of $7, and the normalized weight from d to a is
wˆda = min{1,
$5−$0
$7−$2
} = 1. This means that selecting d
into the seed group {} can make a adopt the concert
ticket immediately. Similarly,
wˆdb =
4
7
, wˆdc = 0, wˆde = 0, wˆdf =
2
7
. 
2. Feedback of Influence Propagation.
Note that the effect of influence propagation is impor-
tant in the commodity promotion. To carefully es-
timate one’s advantage in the promotion, PRUB+IF
further takes the importance feedback from those indi-
viduals i into account on u’s importance, if i adopts the
commodity due to u’s direct or indirect effect and thus
devotes to the propagation of u’s effect. Therefore, u’s
importance towards v will be derived recursively as
follows.
IF
(k+1)(u, v) =


min{1, IF (k)(u, v) +
∑
i∈V
(k)
u
wˆiv}, if u 6= v
0, otherwise
, (4)
where IF (0)(u, v) = wˆuv and V
(k)
u contains the indi-
viduals who newly adopt the commodity by u’s effects
at kth propagation, i.e., V
(k)
u = {i|i ∈ V, IF
(k)(u, i) =
1 ∧ ∀k′ < k, IF (k
′)(u, i) < 1}. As the influence prop-
agates, there are multiple updates for u’s importance
towards v. When the propagation stops, i.e., V
(k)
u =
∅, the final importance of u towards v is denoted as
IF (u, v). In other words, Equation (4) evaluates the
advantage of selecting u into the current seed group
from the aspect of v’s adoption, by considering the
direct effect IF (0)(u, v) = wˆuv derived by Equation
(3) and the indirect effects
∑
k
∑
i∈V
(k)
u
wˆiv propagated
through individuals i. In addition, Equation (4) en-
sures that the importance of u towards v is bounded
by 1, even though there may be many direct and indi-
rect impacts from u to v.
Example 5. Follow Example 4 and consider the indi-
vidual d. Initially, V
(0)
d = {a}, because IF
(0)(d, a) =
wˆda = 1. IF
(1)(d, ·) for all individuals (excluding d
itself) are thus calculated as follows.
Algorithm 2: PRUB+IF
Input: A monetizing social network G = (V,X,E,W,F ); a
set of input prices P ; a quantity of commodities n.
Output: The pricing pmax; the seed group Amax.
1 pmax ← 0, Amax ← ∅, rglobal ← 0
2 Derive Rbound(n, p) for all p ∈ P
3 Sort all p ∈ P descendingly by Rbound(n, p)
4 for p ∈ P do
5 if p is non-candidate pricing then
6 return pmax, Amax
7 A← ∅
8 Compute R(n, p,A)
9 if R(n, p,A) > rglobal then
10 pmax = p, Amax = A, rglobal = R(n, p,A)
11 while |A| < n−
rglobal
p
do
12 for u ∈ V has not adopted the commodity do
13 Compute Ψ(u) according to Equation (5)
14 s← the individual with the greatest Ψ(·)
15 A← A ∪ {s}
16 Compute R(n, p,A)
17 if r > rglobal then
18 pmax = p, Amax = A, rglobal = R(n, p,A)
19 return pmax, Amax
IF (1)(d, a) = min{1, 1 + wˆaa} = 1
IF (1)(d, b) = min{1, 4
7
+ wˆab} =
6
7
IF (1)(d, c) = min{1, 0 + wˆac} =
3
4
IF (1)(d, e) = min{1, 0 + wˆae} = 0
IF (1)(d, f) = min{1, 2
7
+ wˆaf} =
2
7
Since no other individuals newly adopt the concert
ticket, i.e., V
(1)
d = ∅, the propagation stops. Finally,
IF (d, ·) = IF (1)(d, ·) are as above. 
3. Potential-Buyer Filtering.
Once the advantage of selecting an individual as a seed
can be estimated from the aspect of another’s adop-
tion, intuitively, the importance of an individual can
be derived by summing up his/her importance towards
all the others. However, counting one’s importance
towards all the others may be misleading, since the
advantage estimated from those who will never adopt
the commodity at this price is also counted. To avoid
overestimating the importance of an individual in the
promotion, PRUB+IF thus incorporates the concept of
potential buyers into the pricing-sensitive importance
which is formally defined below.
Ψ(u) =
∑
i∈Vpotential
IF (u, i) (5)
where Vpotential is the set of potential buyers at this
price, i.e., the individuals whose maximum valuation
is larger than or equal to the price (the same as intro-
duced in Section 3.1). As a result, only if an individual
is a potential buyer who has potential for adopting the
commodity at the price, the increase of his/her valua-
tion will be regarded as important.
Example 6. Follow Example 5. Since the potential
buyers at the pricing of $7 are a, b, c, and e (referred
to Table 1(a)), the pricing-sensitive importance of d is
Ψ(d) = 1 + 6
7
+ 3
4
+ 0 = 73
28
. 
The algorithm of PRUB+IF is presented in Algorithm 2.
PRUB+IF uses the framework of PRUB as a base, and dif-
fers from PRUB at the strategy for seed selection (Algo-
rithm 2 Lines 12-15). In the following, we go through the de-
tails of PRUB+IF. Similarly to PRUB, PRUB+IF initializes
pmax, Amax, and rglobal, compute the upper bounds of max-
imum revenue for all prices, and then considers the prices
one-by-one in a descending order of the upper bounds of
maximum revenue (Lines 1-3). At a specific price p, PRUB
enumerates all seed groups while PRUB+IF iteratively picks
up a seed until the size of the seed group A reaches the
bound in Equation (2) (Line 11). Specifically, when con-
sidering a price p, PRUB+IF first checks whether or not p
is non-candidate pricing that has no chance to yield higher
revenue than the achievable global revenue rglobal (Line 5).
If p passes the pruning, PRUB+IF first calculates the rev-
enue regarding to the empty seed group (Lines 7-8). Af-
ter that, PRUB+IF expands the seed group by one seed at
a time according to the pricing-sensitive importance Ψ(·)
in Equation (5) (Line 13). Each time the individual who
has not yet adopted the commodity and has the greatest
pricing-sensitive importance will be selected into the cur-
rent seed group (Lines 12-15). In the case of the newly ob-
tained revenue higher than rglobal, PRUB+IF updates pmax,
Amax, and rglobal similarly to PRUB (Lines 17-18). Once
the size of the seed group reaches the bound in Equation
(2) (Line 11), PRUB+IF considers the next price. After all
prices are examined, pmax and Amax are returned as the so-
lution. The following example demonstrates the searching
process of PRUB+IF.
Example 7. Follow Example 2, and initialize pmax, Amax,
and rglobal as $0, an empty set, and $0, respectively. Accord-
ing to the upper bounds of maximum revenue in Table 1(b),
the first price considered is $7. Since Rbound(4, $7) = $28 >
rglobal = $0, PRUB+IF tries to seek for higher revenue at
the price $7. First, for A = {}, there is no revenue since the
inherent valuations of all individuals are less than $7. After
that, for selecting the first seed, PRUB+IF computes the
pricing-sensitive importance of all individuals in a similar
way as shown in Example 6:
Ψ(a) = 29
28
, Ψ(b) = 1
5
, Ψ(c) = 0,
Ψ(d) = 73
28
, Ψ(e) = 15
14
, Ψ(f) = 65
28
.
Hence, the first seed selected is d and the corresponding
revenue will be R(4, $7, {d}) = $7 (referred to Example 1).
As $7 > rglobal = $0, PRUB+IF performs the updates of
pmax = $7, Amax = {d}, and rglobal = $7. Until now,
the process for the first seed finishes, and PRUB+IF checks
whether or not to continue selecting the second seed. Since
|A| = |{d}| = 1 < n −
rglobal
p
= 4 − 7
7
= 3, the pricing-
sensitive importance of all individuals, except the individ-
uals who have adopted the concert tickets, i.e., a and d, is
calculated with respect to the current seed group A = {d}:
Ψ(b) = 0, Ψ(c) = 0, Ψ(e) = 2, Ψ(f) = 3.
Accordingly, f will be selected as the second seed and the
revenue is R(4, $7, {d, f}) = $14 (referred to Example 1),
which leads to the updates of pmax = $7, Amax = {d, f},
and rglobal = $14. Until now, the process for the second seed
finishes, and PRUB+IF checks whether or not to continue
selecting the third seed. However, |A| = 2 reaches the bound
n −
rglobal
p
= 4 − 14
7
= 2 so that the searching at the price
$7 stops.
The searching at the remaining prices p = $6, p = $8, · · · ,
and so on, is performed in the same manner as that at the
price $7. In the end, PRUB+IF will report the pricing of $6
and the seed group {d} as the answer. 
Theorem 3. The time complexity of PRUB+IF is O(n|V |3|P |).
Proof. We first show that PRUB+IF costs O(n|V |3)
time at a specific price for searching the maximum revenue.
Given the quantity of commodities n, the largest size of the
seed group is n. When i seeds have been selected, it takes
O((|V | − i)2) time to compute the pricing-sensitive impor-
tance for each of the other O(|V | − i) nodes. Therefore, the
total time complexity for searching the maximum revenue is
O(
n−1∑
i=1
(|V | − i)3) = O(n|V |3).
As searching at a price costs O(n|V |3), the total time com-
plexity of PRUB+IF is thus O(n|V |3|P |). Theorem 3 is
proved.
4. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we first provide the evidence that the rev-
enue maximization problem with a quantity constraint dif-
fers from that without a quantity constraint. Besides, we
also show the approximation performance of PRUB+IF to
PRUB. In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of PRUB+IF,
we further conduct experiments on larger real social net-
works and compare PRUB+IF with other heuristics. All
the programs are implemented in Java with version 1.6.0 27.
The experiments are performed on a quad-core Intelr Xeonr
X5450 3.00GHz PC with 8GB RAM using Ubuntu 8.04.2.
Datasets. We use three real social networks as follows.
1) The dataset highschool (sampled from the dataset [6] due
to poor scalability of PRUB and the compared approach) is
a friendship network for the boys in a small highschool in
Illinois.1 The nodes are boys in the highschool, and each
directed edge represents a boy choosing another as a friend
in questionnaires. 2) The dataset digg [4] is a reply network
of Digg.2 Each node is a user in Digg and each directed edge
stands for a user replying to another. 3) The dataset face-
book [22] is the communication network of Facebook.3 The
nodes are the users in Facebook while each directed edge rep-
resents that a user posts an article on another user’s wall.
For these datasets, the self-loops and isolated nodes are re-
moved, and the edge weights are derived from the number of
choices, replies, and articles of one to another, respectively.
Both the degree distributions and weight distributions of
all the datasets follow the well-known power law [5]. More
details are shown in the left five columns of Table 2.
Valuation Distributions. Note that there is lack of
valuation information in these publicly available datasets.
A na¨ıve way is to learn the valuation information through
questionnaires or historical sales data toward a specific com-
modity. However, note that the valuation distributions vary
with commodities. In this paper, we then explore the per-
formance under different valuation distributions as follows.
1http://moreno.ss.uci.edu/data.html#high
2http://www.public.asu.edu/~mdechoud/datasets.html
(The reply system has been out of service since 2012, but
the data were collected in 2008.)
3http://socialnetworks.mpi-sws.org/data-wosn2009.html
Table 2: Summaries of real datasets and the parameters of each valuation distribution.
Dataset #nodes #edges Avg. degree Avg. weight Avg. clustering coeff.
Normal M-shape
µ σ2 µ σ2 µ σ2
highschool 50 140 5.60 37.29 0.4754 10 8.16 4 1.78 16 1.78
digg 30,360 85,155 5.61 6.07 0.0053 5 2.04 2 0.44 8 0.44
facebook 45,813 183,412 8.01 4.66 0.1106 5 2.04 2 0.44 8 0.44
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Figure 2: The comparison for maximum revenue.
• Normal distribution (N): Most people have similar val-
uations and a few people have extremely higher or
lower valuations toward a commodity.
• M-shape distribution (M) [18]: People do not have con-
sensus on the value of a commodity. One group of
people have higher valuations and the other group of
people have lower valuations toward the commodity.
In our experiments, we implement the M-shape distribution
using two Normal distributions, where the valuation of each
individual follows one of the Normal distributions with equal
probabilities. The parameters for generating the valuations
are listed in the right three columns of Table 2.
Concave influence function. As introduced in Sec-
tion 2, any non-negative, non-decreasing, and concave func-
tion can be applied to the concave influence function. In our
experiments, we consider the function F (x) = x to transform
the weights into the valuation concept for simplicity.
Input prices. By considering different currencies, costs,
and cultures in different countries, the pricing of a commod-
ity may be different. For simplicity, we set the prices as
input parameters in the experiments. For highschool, the
input prices are all integers (as the unit of the dollars) in
[1, 300], due to the smaller size of the network. For digg and
facebook, the input prices are all integers in [1, 2000].
4.1 Consideration of Quantity Constraints
In this subsection, we first show that the consideration
of a quantity constraint in the revenue maximization prob-
lem makes it differ from the original problem by comparing
PRUB with the previous work [17], referred to as Random-
izedUSM in this paper. Due to poor scalability of PRUB
and RandomizedUSM, these experiments are conducted on
the small dataset highschool with Normal and M-shape val-
uation distributions. In addition, note that since Random-
izedUSM does not consider a quantity constraint, we derive
the revenue with two kinds of post-processes as follows.
• RandomizedUSM: Given the solution pair of p and A
RandomizedUSM reports, this post-process considers
the quantity constraint n by calculating the quanti-
ties left for sale and computing the revenue as p ×
min{|σ(A) \A|, n− |A|}, where σ(A) ⊇ A is the set of
individuals adopting the commodity under A’s effects.
• RandomizedUSM(p): This post-process considers the
quantity constraint n at each price and then returns
the highest revenue among all prices. For each price p
and the corresponding seed group Ap obtained by Ran-
domizedUSM, the revenue is p×min{|σ(Ap)\Ap|, n−
|Ap|}, where σ(Ap) ⊇ Ap is the set of individuals
adopting the commodity under Ap’s effects.
Figure 2 shows the maximum revenue reported by Ran-
domizedUSM, RandomizedUSM(p), PRUB+IF and PRUB
with respect to different ratios of the quantity of commodi-
ties to the number of population, i.e., n
|V |
. Accordingly,
the revenue reported by RandomizedUSM and Randomize-
dUSM(p) is, on average, less than 70% of that obtained by
PRUB. Moreover, note that RandomizedUSM has the poor-
est performance and even brings zero revenue at the cases
of the supply ratio below 0.2. These results demonstrate
that the capability of the previous approach [17] (even with
the post-processes) is limited for the RMw/QC problem. On
the other hand, even for the special case that the quantity is
not constrained, i.e., the ratio of the quantity of commodities
to the number of population n
|V |
= 1, PRUB+IF still out-
performs RandomizedUSM and RandomizedUSM(p). This
is because PRUB+IF selects seeds in order of the pricing-
sensitive importance while RandomizedUSM and Random-
izedUSM(p) consider the seeds in arbitrary order.
On the same datasets, we then also explore the approxi-
mation of PRUB+IF to PRUB (which derives the optimal
solutions). According to the results in Figure 2, the per-
formance of PRUB+IF is very close to that of PRUB, i.e.,
about 96% on average, and outperforms both Randomize-
dUSM and RandomizedUSM(p). This implies that the pro-
posed pricing-sensitive improtance of PRUB+IF is highly
effective to identity the crucial individuals as seeds.
4.2 Performance of the PRUB+IF heuristic
In this subsection, we conduct experiments on larger datasets
digg and facebook to further show the performance of Algo-
rithm PRUB+IF in terms of effectiveness, pricing, and effi-
ciency. Here PRUB+IF is compared with two other heuris-
tics PRUB+R and PRUB+SW. These two heuristics also
take the PRUB approach as the framework while applying
different strategies for seed selection. Specifically, PRUB+R
(R standing for Random) selects seeds randomly; PRUB+SW
(SW meaning Sum of the Weights) always picks up the in-
dividual with the maximum sum of out-weights from those
who have not yet adopted the commodity. Besides, in order
to demonstrate the advantage of each part of PRUB+IF, the
heuristics PRUB+N, PRUB+F, and PRUB+P represent the
approaches that incorporate Normalized Weight, Feedback
of Influence Propagation, and Potential-buyer Filtering, re-
spectively, for seed selection.
Effectiveness. Here we use the maximum revenue ob-
tained without consideration of social influences (NoSocial),
i.e., the adoption of an individual only depends on his/her in-
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Figure 3: The effectiveness comparison.
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
1
2
3
4
n
|V |
M
a
x
.
re
v
e
n
u
e
(t
h
e
ra
ti
o
to
N
o
S
o
c
ia
l)
PRUB+IF
PRUB+N
PRUB+F
PRUB+P
(a) digg(N)
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
1
2
3
4
n
|V |
M
a
x
.
re
v
e
n
u
e
(t
h
e
ra
ti
o
to
N
o
S
o
c
ia
l)
PRUB+IF
PRUB+N
PRUB+F
PRUB+P
(b) digg(M)
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
2
4
6
8
n
|V |
M
a
x
.
re
v
e
n
u
e
(t
h
e
ra
ti
o
to
N
o
S
o
c
ia
l)
PRUB+IF
PRUB+N
PRUB+F
PRUB+P
(c) facebook(N)
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
2
4
6
8
n
|V |
M
a
x
.
re
v
e
n
u
e
(t
h
e
ra
ti
o
to
N
o
S
o
c
ia
l)
PRUB+IF
PRUB+N
PRUB+F
PRUB+P
(d) facebook(M)
Figure 4: The advantage of each part of PRUB+IF.
herent valuation, as the baseline, and show the effectiveness
of the heuristics in ratios to the baseline. Figure 3 reports
the effectiveness with respect to different ratios of the quan-
tity of commodities to the number of population, i.e., n
|V |
.
For these results, we have two observations as follows. First,
on digg and facebook with both Normal and M-shape valu-
ation distributions, PRUB+IF is the best, and PRUB+SW
outperforms PRUB+R only in the cases of small n
|V |
. The
reason is that, to estimate the advantage of selecting an indi-
vidual in the promotion, PRUB+IF introduces the pricing-
sensitive importance, which considers the normalized effects
of the influence propagated through the social network, while
PRUB+SW only takes the sum of weights on one’s direct
out-neighbors. RRUB+R picks the seeds blindly. Second, as
n
|V |
decreases, the performance of PRUB+IF becomes even
more noticeable (compared to PRUB+SW and PRUB+R).
This is because the number of potential buyers reduces when
the pricing of the commodity increases due to scarcity. The
less the number of potential buyers is, the more challenging
the seed selection is. Hence, the results demonstrate that
the strategy of PRUB+IF for the seed selection outperforms
those of PRUB+SW and PRUB+R.
In order to demonstrate the advantage of each part of
PRUB+IF, Figure 4 shows the effectiveness of PRUB+IF,
PRUB+N, PRUB+F, and PRUB+P with respect to dif-
ferent ratios of the quantity of commodities to the num-
ber of population, i.e., n
|V |
. Accordingly, the three parts of
PRUB+IF are more or less all equally important.
Pricing. In addition to the demonstration of effectiveness
by maximum revenue, whether or not the suggested pricing
complies with the common sense is also an interesting ques-
tion. For answering this question, we plotted the trend of the
pricing suggested by PRUB+IF, PRUB+SW, PRUB+R,
and NoSocial with respect to different ratios of the quan-
tity of commodities to the number of population, i.e., n
|V |
,
in Figure 5. Accordingly, PRUB+IF suggests higher pric-
ing in most cases than the other approaches to gain higher
maximum revenue (as shown in Figure 3) in all cases. This
implies that PRUB+IF performs the most elegant strategy
for seed selection. The smart utilization of word-of-mouth
effects can help the promotion of commodities in higher pric-
ing, which complies with the common sense. Furthermore,
for all methods, there is a upward trend in the pricing as
n
|V |
decreases. The less the quantity is, the more precious
the commodity could be, which also complies with the com-
mon sense. There are some exceptions to this pricing trend:
PRUB+IF at 0.25 on digg(M), and both PRUB+SW and
PRUB+R at 0.25 or 0.3 on facebook(N). The reason is that a
quantity of supply is used as freebies. This may allow higher
pricing in some cases by leaving less quantities for sale. The
tiny example in Figure 6 explains such a case in more de-
tails. (F (x) = x is used as the concave influence function.)
For the case of the quantity of the concert tickets as 2, the
maximum revenue is R(2, $3, ∅) = $6 (i.e., b and c adopt
the concert tickets). Now consider that the quantity of the
concert tickets is increased to 3. The maximum revenue is
R(3, $7, {a, c}) = $7 (i.e., b adopts the concert ticket under
the impact of a and c). The pricing is higher even though
the quantity increases. This is because 2 out of 3 concert
tickets are used as free tickets and only 1 concert ticket is
left for sale. Hence, according to these results, PRUB+IF is
capable of suggesting elegant marketing strategies.
Efficiency. Now we compare the efficiency of the three
heuristics. Figure 7 shows the runtime with respect to dif-
ferent ratios of the quantity of commodities to the number of
population, i.e., n
|V |
, on digg(N), digg(M), facebook(N), and
facebook(M). PRUB+IF spends more execution time than
PRUB+SW and PRUB+R in all cases, since PRUB+IF con-
siders the influence propagation in the derivation of pricing-
sensitive importance for seed selection. PRUB+R generally
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Figure 5: The pricing comparison.
a($1) b($3) c($3)
2
2
Figure 6: An example for the exception to the pric-
ing trend.
spends a little bit more time than PRUB+SW due to the
blind seed selection (that makes PRUB+R need to search
more prices for finding maximum revenue). Nevertheless,
the runtime of all the three heuristics is not sensitive to n
|V |
.
For PRUB+IF, other factors such as the local structure of
potential buyers and the influence cascades will also affect
the runtime.
5. RELATED WORKS
Influence Maximization. The influence maximization
problem aims at identifying a group of seeds so that the num-
ber of the active people is the largest [3, 7, 15, 19]. To the
best of our knowledge, the first study could be traced to the
work [7], where Domingos et al. studied the influence maxi-
mization problem as an algorithmic problem. Then, Kempe
et al. [15] formally modeled the problem as a discrete op-
timization, which is to identify k seeds for maximizing the
influence spread over the social network. Meanwhile, Kempe
et al. also showed that the influence maximization problem
is NP-hard under both the Linear Threshold (LT) and the
Independent Cascade (IC) models, and proposed a greedy
strategy with approximation guarantees. Specifically, in the
LT model, the influences on an individual are cumulative,
and each individual has his/her own activation threshold.
An individual becomes active if the sum of weights from
his/her active neighbors is larger than or equal to his/her
activation threshold. Then, this active individual will also
propagate influences to his/her inactive neighbors. In the
IC model, each influence an individual receives is indepen-
dent. For each influence, there is one and only one chance to
activate the individual with a probability. If the individual
becomes active, he/she futher spreads his/her influence in
the same mannar. In the work [3], Chen et al. showed that,
given seeds, computing the influence spread under the LT
model is #P-hard, and provided a scalable heuristic based
on the fast computation for directed acyclic graphs (DAGs).
Singer [19] concerned the inherent costs of making individ-
uals as seeds and followed the incentive compatible mecha-
nism to extract the true information about individuals’ costs
for identifying and rewarding the seeds. As mentioned in
Section 1, all these influence maximization problems do not
take the monetary effects on people’s purchase decisions into
account, and thus differ from our problem.
Revenue Maximization. The problem of revenue max-
imization is to derive the marketing strategy that brings
the optimal revenue under the social influence, and was first
addressed by Hartline et al. [11]. As a solution, Hartline et
al. [11] proposed a marketing strategy, named influence-and-
exploit (IE), to tackle the problem in two steps. In the influ-
ence step, IE identifies a group of customers as seeds. After
that, in the exploit step, IE visits the remaining customers in
a random order and offers each of them the optimal (myopic)
pricing of the product in order to maximize the revenue. The
decision whether or not an individual purchases the product
depends on the pricing offered and the individual’s valua-
tion, which takes the social influences into consideration.
Hartline et al. [11] also discussed the inferences of the val-
uations from social influences by Uniform Additive Model,
Symmetric Model, and Concave Graph Model. Later, Fo-
takis et al. [9] proposed a polynomial-time approach to ap-
proximate the maximum revenue in the Uniform Additive
Model. Another work [16] distinguishes between activation
and adoption. When an individual is active by the social in-
fluence, he/she will then determine whether or not to adopt
the product with respect to the pricing and his/her valua-
tion. The marketing strategy of all these works is to deter-
mine customized pricing for different customers.
Mirrokni et al. [17] argued that offering the product at
fixed pricing is more reasonable since offering customized
pricing is hard to implement in the real world. Hence, their
objective is to discover a seed group with the fixed pricing
to maximize the revenue. Mirrokni et al. [17] adopted the
Concave Graph Model proposed in the work [11] to incor-
porate the social influence into the valuation, and presented
a (1/2)-approximation based on the randomized linear time
approximation algorithm for the Unconstrained Submodular
Maximization problem.
However, all the works above assumed that there is an
unlimited supply of commodities, whereas we consider the
scenario with limited supply such as limited edition com-
modities and concert tickets. As shown in Sections 1 and 4.1,
it is unapplicable for these works to determine the proper
marketing strategies.
6. CONCLUSION
In this work, we addressed the revenue maximization prob-
lem with a quantity constraint on a monetizing social net-
work. To maximize the revenue, the marketing strategy is
to determine the pricing of the commodity and find a seed
group of individuals as the initial customers. Hence, we pro-
vided Algorithm PRUB to derive the pricing and the seed
group for the optimal revenue. For better efficiency, we fur-
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Figure 7: The runtime comparison.
ther proposed Algorithm PRUB+IF as a heuristic algorithm
based on the framework of PRUB for a feasible solution. The
experiments on real datasets with different valuation distri-
butions showed the effectiveness of PRUB and PRUB+IF.
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